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Introduction
The role central bank communication plays in monetary policy has been studied extensively.
The majority of this work concentrates on formal communication, as it examines statements after interest rate decisions, minutes of committee meetings, or monetary policy reports. An even larger number of papers examine the impact of the rate decisions themselves. However, speeches are a substantive part of central bank communication, too. These less formal channels of communication are rarely studied, which is surprising as the Federal Reserve (Fed) has not only improved its formal communication over the last decade but, starting in the late 1990, also increased, to an even greater degree, the number of 'informal' speeches delivered. 1 The Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) meets only eight times a year and the monetary policy report is issued semi-annually. Thus, speeches might be an additional source of information for market participants. Given their greater frequency, speeches can be interpreted as an update to formal statements and monetary policy decisions and hence market participants might very well utilise and react to this additional information.
There is a growing body of literature investigating the effects of (formal) communication on financial markets (for a comprehensive survey of the relevant literature, see Blinder et al., 2008) . Here, we summarise a few selected studies only. An important study closely related to our paper is by Ehrmann and Fratzscher (2007) . In their panel analysis of three central banks, they do not examine the communication content directly as they use newswire information based on FOMC communication to create their indicators. They find that speeches or interviews regarding the economic outlook (EO) have a consistently positive impact on daily bond returns for up to 10 years. News concerning the course of monetary policy (MP) has a positive effect on only a few maturities. On the equity market, an indication of rising interest rates leads to declining returns, whereas positive EO news generates higher returns. Some other papers also assess the impact of mostly formal communications by the Federal Reserve (e.g., Connolly and Kohler, 2004; Kohn and Sack, 2004; Chirinko and Curran, 2005; Reinhart and Sack, 2005) . These papers have at least three findings in common. important than speeches. Third, the more prominent the position held by the speaker, the stronger the financial market reaction.
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This paper makes two significant contributions to the literature. First, we use an extensive data set covering all speeches delivered by FOMC members and study their impact on US financial market returns (see Hayo et al. 2012 The remainder of this paper is organised as follows. In the next section, we explain our approach of measuring Federal Reserve communication and provide details on the construction of the central bank news. Section 3 describes the data set and empirical methodology. In Section 4, we empirically study the effects of communication on US financial market returns. Section 5 discusses the special role of central bank communication during the financial crisis. Section 6 concludes.
Measuring Federal Reserve Communications
For our analysis, we employ a data set that covers summaries of 1,994 speeches, 227
congressional hearings (including the semi-annual monetary policy reports), and 94 postmeeting statements from members of the Board of Governors (BOG) and the regional Fed presidents (see Hayo et al. 2012) . 3 There is consensus in the literature about how to measure the timing of statements accompanying target rate decisions and monetary policy reports.
These are predefined events and the content of the communications can be extracted from central bank websites. In the case of the less formal and irregularly timed speeches, the majority of surveys rely on financial newswire reports, but even advocates of these reports are quick to point out a major drawback of them. For example, Blinder et al. (2008) Content analysis, which is a 'technique for making inferences by objectively and systematically identifying specified characteristics of messages' (Holsti, 1969, 14) , can help reduce the risk of misclassification. In line with this idea, each speech was carefully read and independently coded into the dummy categories by three different individuals. In the rare case of a conflict between the classifications, the relevant speech was checked one more time and the coding adjusted accordingly. 7 In our analysis, we engage in extensive robustness testing to ensure that our results are not dependent on possibly individual-specific coding of ambiguous content.
Communication events occurring after market closure were coded as if they happened the next day. Data are obtained from the official websites of the Fed regional banks and the Board of the Governors of the Federal Reserve System. Table 1 summarises the frequency of these events. From the table, it can be observed that (i) more comments were made regarding the EO than the MP stance, and (ii) a positive economic outlook and hawkish comments occur far more often than a negative economic outlook or an indication of expansionary monetary policy. The first finding is due to an apparent change in Fed communication strategy. In the early years of our sample period, speakers concentrated on explaining previous interest rate Kohn and Sack (2004) study the effects of U.S. central bank communication events on the volatility of financial variables. The simple idea behind this approach is that if communications affect the returns on financial assets, the volatility of these returns should be higher on days of central bank communications. On the one hand, this approach is less prone to mistakes by the researcher or misinterpretation by financial newswires. The obvious drawback is that there is no control for whether markets move in the correct (or intended) direction. Additionally, equality restrictions between different types of news are set, so that one cannot distinguish between possibly larger reactions to bad than to good news. Finally, higher volatility can be an indication of (i) higher noise reflecting uncertainty or (ii) actual news requiring traders to alter their behaviour. 5 Speeches without any information on monetary policy stance or economic outlook and speeches with 'neutral' content are coded as non-events. 6 An alternative to subjective coding is using content analysis software (e.g., Lucca and Trebbi, 2009 ). However, communications other than post-meeting statements are not standardised and thus content analysis programs fail to detect all relevant systematic patterns in these much more complex texts. 7 In the Appendix, we provide a few examples of speeches along with our classification of them.
moves, whereas in the later years, monetary policy speeches were more forward looking.
Also, cheaper liquidity tends to cause few problems for market participants and thus a rate cut does not need to be prepared for by the central bank as extensively as does a hike. This second point is also due to the asymmetry of the size of target rate hikes and cuts in our sample.
Target rate increases are mostly performed in 25 basis points (bps) steps and well-prepared for in advance by communication, which allows market participants to make necessary adjustments gradually in the run-up to the expected interest rate decision. In contrast, target rate decreases are often done in 50 bps steps and less explained by Fed officials in advance. 
Data and Econometric Methodology
Our US financial market indicators comprise daily closing interest rates on government securities as well as daily returns on stock markets from January 2, 1998 through December 31, 2009. 9 As dependent variables, we employ daily changes of 3-month, 6-month, and 1-year Treasury bills, and 5-year Treasury notes. For the stock market, we examine the daily growth rates of the S&P 500 Index. 10 Descriptive statistics (see Table A1 in the Appendix) show that all financial markets series exhibit excess kurtosis, indicating ARCH effects (Engle, 1982) . To increase the estimation efficiency, we employ a GARCH (1,1) model (Bollerslev, 1986 ) for all bond maturities and the stock market series. 11 The general specification is as follows:
8 On nine occasions in our sample, financial market participants were surprised by an interest rate cut, whereas the Fed unexpectedly raised its target rate only four times. Bloomberg surveys are used to identify surprises that occur during scheduled meetings. Intermeeting moves are naturally classified as surprises. For instance, a 'surprise hike' can be (i) an unexpected rise in the target rate or (ii) an unchanged target rate when a rate cut was expected. 9 Data sources: bond and foreign exchange market series-Federal Reserves' Statistical Releases H10 and H15; stock market series-Yahoo! Finance database. 10 We chose daily data instead of intra-day data for two reasons. At a conceptual level, we are interested in the question of whether there are effects of economic importance characterised by some sort of persistence over time instead of just picking out short blips in the data. Even though the scheduled delivery time of speeches is recorded at the central bank's website, we find it impossible to time the central bank news precisely in 5-minute time intervals, as can be done for newswire reports. 11 Estimation within an EGARCH framework (Nelson, 1991) was not possible, as the algorithm did not converge. Doornik and Ooms (2008) suggest that the presence of dummy variables could cause such problems.
where       , and  are parameters or vectors of parameters and  t | t-1 = t(v), with  t-1 capturing all the information up to t-1 and t(v) being a t-distribution with v degrees of freedom. Equation (1) is an autoregressive-distributed lag model with one lag. The vector of financial control variables comprises bond returns, S&P 500 returns, and returns of the US broad foreign exchange rate index. 12 Day of the week effects are captured by dummies, using Monday as the reference day. Student-t distributed errors (Bollerslev, 1987) are assumed; these provide a better approximation of residuals that are not normally distributed.
We include in the estimation the surprise components of several macroeconomic announcements commonly watched by market participants. 13 We choose 10 news items: After estimating these rich GARCH (1,1) models, we exclude all insignificant variables in a consistent general-to-specific approach (Hendry, 1995) .
Federal Reserve Communications and Financial Market Returns
In this section, we discuss the reaction of financial markets to central bank communications using Equation (1) and the full sample period (1998) (1999) (2000) (2001) (2002) (2003) (2004) (2005) (2006) (2007) (2008) (2009) 14 We find that the shorter bond maturities (3-month and 6-month) are affected by a larger variety of communications (as well as by target rate changes and unorthodox measures) than are the longer maturities (1-year and 5-year). In contrast, macroeconomic surprises are more important for the longer maturities. Thus, US monetary policy actions and related communications lead to 'target surprises' rather than to 'path surprises' (Gürkaynak et al., 2005) . To put it differently, the Fed is able to change its short-term monetary policy without affecting longer-term inflation expectations. However, when significant reactions are found, the impact of communication is ascending with maturity. Ehrmann and Fratzscher (2007) report a similar result.
The monetary policy part of communications is more important than the economic outlook as we find only one significant coefficient for the latter. Our interpretation is that financial market participants alter their expectations about the future course of monetary policy after central bank communications, whereas macroeconomic news has more of an effect on expectations about the real economy. Generally, central bank communications move the financial markets in the intended direction: 15 (i) hawkish communications raise bond yields, (ii) communication indicating a future target rate cut leads to a decrease in bond returns, and (iii) a worse economic outlook decreases stock returns.
14 The coefficients can be interpreted as follows: 0.016 denotes an increase of 3-month bonds by 1.6 bps after a one standard deviation shock in NFP +; -0.085 denotes a decrease by 8.5 bps after a 25 bps target rate surprise cut; 0.027 denotes an increase by 2.7 bps after a hawkish speech delivered by the Chairman. 15 All but three coefficients ('ISM -' on the stock market and 'Discount Rate' on the 1-year and 5-year bond market) show the expected sign. One of the novel aspects of this paper is its consideration of communication by individual members of the Fed. We compare the impact of speeches by the Chairman, other governors, voting presidents, and nonvoting presidents on US financial markets. Our prior is that the 'inside' governors (particularly the Chairman) should command greater attention from financial market participants and, therefore, exert a greater influence on returns than the 'outside' presidents (particularly the nonvoting presidents). In line with the literature (Ehrmann and Fratzscher, 2007) , our results suggest that communications by the Chairman of the Board of Governors generate relatively more public attention than speeches by other governors or presidents. 16 We find no significant differences between voting and nonvoting presidents. Finally, we also find evidence of the asymmetry hypothesis as dovish speeches (when they are significant) move interest rates more than hawkish ones; for example, we observe differences between the Chairman's positive and negative monetary policy inclination.
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In the next step, we evaluate the economic impact of central bank communication on financial markets relative to other macroeconomic shocks. The coefficients in Table 2 can be misleading insofar as some news categories might typically occur more often than others. As a consequence, a fairly small coefficient might have a large cumulative influence on the observed behaviour of financial markets if the frequency of this event is relatively high, and vice versa. Therefore, we compare the impact by taking into account the frequency of news as measured in our 12-year sample. Table 3 shows the cumulative impact on returns per category on each market. Note: The figures are calculated by taking the absolute estimates from Table 2 , which are then multiplied by the respective frequency of news.
Due to their higher frequency, macroeconomic shocks exert a larger impact on all bond maturities as well as on the stock market. However, for the short maturities (3-month and 6-month) and the equity market, the influence of central bank communication is economically relevant, as its cumulative impact is almost half as large as that of macroeconomic shocks. In confirmation of the finding that Fed communications cause 'target surprises' rather than 'path surprises', the maximum impact of monetary policy communications is found for 6-month bonds and is close to zero for the 5 year horizon.
16 Statistical tests confirm this result for 3-month bonds (Chairman MP -vs. Voting Pres. MP -: Chi 2 (1) = 14.2**; Chairman MP -vs. Nonvot. Pres. MP -: Chi 2 (1) = 18.0**). For the longer maturities, we find larger point estimates for the Chairman. 17 3-month bonds: Chairman MP + vs. Chairman MP -: Chi 2 (1) = 5.6*.
The Special Role of Central Bank Communication During the Financial Crisis
Because our sample includes the period August 2007-December 2009, we can address the question of whether there is a different financial market reaction during 'crisis times' compared to during 'normal times.' We expect central bank communications to play an even more pronounced role during the recent financial crisis, as the Fed put a great deal of effort into preparing and explaining both its conventional and unconventional monetary policy actions. Table 4 presents the results for Equation (1) Our results suggest that communication by the Chairman generates a (slightly) larger reaction from financial markets than do speeches by other governors (which are, however, significant during the financial crisis) and both receive much more attention than those by presidents. 18 Finally, we find speeches by nonvoting presidents to be more important in terms of significant coefficients than those of voting presidents.
During the financial crisis, the economic outlook aspect of communication becomes relevant. Given that there is no room for further target rate cuts at the zero lower bound, financial markets might perceive a negative economic outlook as an 'implied easing' signal, in the sense that the Fed will keep rates low for a long period of time. To assess the relative economic importance of communication referring to the economic outlook or the monetary policy inclination, we take into account the impact of the frequency of news. Table 5 shows the cumulative impact on returns per category on each market in our sample. Although the economic outlook is now relevant for all bond maturities, the cumulative influence of the monetary policy inclination continues to be larger. A second notable finding is that-in comparison to the full sample (Table 3) As in the case of the full sample, communication exerts the largest influence on 6-month bonds, but the difference from other maturities is smaller during the financial crisis.
Conclusions
In this paper, we study the effects of Federal Reserve communications, particularly speeches, Second, one of the novel aspects of this study is its consideration of communication by individual members of the Fed. Our results suggest that communications by the Chairman generate relatively more public attention than speeches by other governors or presidents. We find no significant difference in the attention given to speeches of voting and nonvoting presidents. Finally, financial markets show an asymmetric reaction: dovish speeches move interest rates more than hawkish ones.
Third, as to whether there is a different financial market reaction during 'crisis times' compared to during 'normal times', we find, in general, more significant communication variables in the financial crisis subsample (especially for the stock market). In addition, the absolute size of the coefficients is higher on all bond and stock markets. The strong reaction during the financial crisis shows how crucial central bank communication is in turbulent times. Financial markets closely monitor every speech and adjust their prices to a larger extent than they do during 'normal times'.
In future research it would be interesting to examine to what extent financial market agents monitor central bank actions and communications directly and when and why they rely on newswire services. This question could be answered using a survey of financial market participants.
Examples of Speeches and Their Coding
Remarks by Chairman Alan Greenspan Before the Economic Club of New York (24 May
2001)
Moreover, with inflation low and likely to be contained, the main threat to satisfactory economic performance appeared to come from excessive weakness in activity. … The period of sub-par economic growth is not yet over, and we are not free of the risk that economic weakness will be greater than currently anticipated, requiring further policy response. After having risen at an annual rate of 2 1/2 percent in the first half of last year, real GDP increased at an annual pace of more than 6 percent in the second half. … Although real GDP is not likely to continue advancing at the same pace as in the second half of 2003, recent data indicate that growth of activity has remained robust thus far this year. … As I have noted previously, the federal funds rate must rise at some point to prevent pressures on price inflation from eventually emerging.
Coding: Testimony Alan Greenspan EO Positive / Alan Greenspan MP Tightening 
